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Abstract
Cognitive neuroscientists habitually deny that functional neuroimaging can furnish causal information
about the relationship between brain events and behavior. However, imaging studies do provide causal
information about those relationships although not causal certainty. Although popular portrayals of
functional neuroimaging tend to attribute too much inferential power to the technique, we should restrain
ourselves from ascribing it too little.
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Matthew J. Weber and Sharon L. Thompson-Schill

Abstract
■ Cognitive neuroscientists habitually deny that functional

although not causal certainty. Although popular portrayals of
functional neuroimaging tend to attribute too much inferential
power to the technique, we should restrain ourselves from ascribing it too little. ■

It is a healthy truism that secure inference in cognitive
neuroscience requires converging methods. The brain is
enormously complex, and vital knowledge about it has
arisen at vastly different spatial and temporal scales, through
observational methods as well as natural and engineered
interventions. In light of the fieldʼs distinguished origins in
lesion studies and single-unit neurophysiology, functional
neuroimaging is too readily ceded pride of place in the
canon of cognitive neuroscience methods—but that does
not license its critics or its practitioners to invent limitations
on the technique. Functional imaging is many things, but
despite the familiar shibboleth, it is not merely correlational.1 Imaging studies provide causal information, although not causal certainty, about the influence of brain
activity on behavior. Moreover, the influence on brain activity of experimentally manipulated variables, such as stimuli and task instructions, is unarguably causal.
The popularity of brain stimulation techniques in cognitive neuroscience is rising, and researchers often justify
using these techniques by invoking the inability of functional imaging to address causal matters (Iacoboni, 2009;
Ruff et al., 2008; Wagner, Valero-Cabre, & Pascual-Leone,
2007; Uddin, Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, & Iacoboni, 2006).
These justifications can be misleading. For example, Uddin
et al. (2006) state that “functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) provides only correlational information about
the relationship between a given brain area and a particular
cognitive task. Causal relationships between brain and behaviour can be tested with [transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)].” To say that “fMRI provides only correlational
information” is to render inexplicable the utility of fMRIguided TMS, which relies on the reasonable expectation
that areas activated concurrently with task performance are
likely to be causally involved in the task. On the other hand,

the causal involvement of a given brain region in a task is
no guarantee that the region implements the computation
of interest in a given experiment; for example, diverse tasks
across the domains of attention, memory, language, and
cognitive control would suffer from well-targeted TMS to
primary visual cortex.
We suspect that a key factor confusing this issue is the
difference between correlational and merely observational
information. When we observe two variables, neither of
which is experimentally manipulated, we are powerless
to assign causal influence. Some information from functional imaging studies has this character—for example,
the relationship between brain activity and reaction times,
preferences, or demographic variables. Likewise, because
functional imaging studies do not manipulate brain activity
directly, they cannot capture causality when the variables
of interest are both neural. Miller, Vytlacil, Fegen, Pradhan,
and DʼEsposito (2010) show that disruption of lateral
prefrontal cortex activity changes category selectivity in
extrastriate cortex, a causal observation that could not be
supported by fMRI alone. However, it is common to manipulate subjectsʼ perception or behavior and measure
brain activity at different levels of that manipulation. This
experimental structure informs us about the influence of
behavior on brain activity—which is not identical but unquestionably relevant to influence flowing the other way.
Sarter, Berntson, and Cacioppo (1996) provide a useful
framework with which to interpret the information gained
from imaging experiments versus studies of lesions and
brain stimulation: The latter inform us about P(B[ehavior] |
A[ctivity]), whereas imaging studies testify to P(A | B). On
this account, functional imagingʼs informativeness about
causal hypotheses becomes clear: P(B | A) increases with
P(A | B) via Bayesʼ rule.2 Having construed conventionally
“causal” and “correlational” methods in a symmetric probabilistic framework, Sarter et al. acknowledge “a fundamental asymmetry in the heuristic power” of these studies that
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favors the former. We are content with this concession,
merely adding that the advantage obtains only once we
know where to stimulate or which patients to test.
One might object that the claim “functional imaging is
merely correlational” does not deny these points—rather,
it denies only that functional imaging by itself can provide
certainty about the causal influence of brain activity on
behavior. We doubt that the claim is often construed this
narrowly, but thus read, it is of course accurate. However,
it is plain that some functional imaging studies are specifically interested in the relationship between stimulus
presentation or task-related behavior and brain activity.
Atkinson and Adolphs (2005) claim that “functional imaging techniques support only correlational rather than
causal claims about brain function,” but they review several
studies reporting that confronting participants with certain
facial expressions elicits activity in amygdala, anterior insula, and striatum—a causal relationship. Several groups
have shown that machine learning algorithms, applied to
cortical activity evoked by visible lines and those masked
into invisibility, can read out the orientation of those lines
(Haynes & Rees, 2005; Kamitani & Tong, 2005); to claim that
the brain activity they observed was not caused by the stimuli is to invalidate their work. Likewise, clinical studies sometimes seek to differentiate patient populations from one
another or from healthy controls by observing differences
in task-related brain activity. Fales et al. (2008, 2009) reported elevated amygdala activity in depressive patients
viewing fear-related stimuli compared with controls in the
same condition and separately that antidepressant medication normalizes prefrontal hypoactivity in depressives performing an emotional-interference task. To claim that the
observed brain activity was not caused by the behavior is
to negate the possibility of understanding the depressive
brain as it interacts with the world in both the lay and the
statistical senses to limit inference to the general tendency
or main effect. However, these scientists have done better.
There is no need to slight their contributions by making inaccurate disclaimers about their methods.
We acknowledge that, in general, the problem with functional imaging lists the other way. Both grant reviewers
and the popular media are keenly interested in the brain–
behavior relationships about which imaging research must
remain tentative, and we often do not meet these enthusiasms with appropriate moderation. In addition, it is essential that cognitive neuroscientists be clear about the
comparative strengths of nonimaging techniques. Still, to
demean any of our methods cavalierly is to weaken the
reputation of the whole field. Let us be forthright about
our capabilities as well as our limitations.
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Notes
1. Readers preoccupied with moral purity are encouraged not
to look up one authorʼs reference to “the correlational nature
of functional neuroimaging methods” (Thompson-Schill et al.,
2002).
2. Poldrack (2006) offers a fuller treatment of Bayesian inference from neuroimaging data.
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